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This paper seeks to identify the significance of, and the potential causes of the so-called 
“indirect” costs of bankruptcy.  These costs include such factors as lost sales from falling 
demand as a result of customer concerns over future service difficulties, declining margins 
resulting from increased input costs from suppliers, loss of key personnel, and loss of 
management time and effort.  Naturally, such costs are difficult to measure and, consequently, 
there is a dearth of information on their potential magnitude.  However, it is generally believed 
that these indirect costs can be substantially higher than the more easily observed “direct” costs 
of bankruptcy.  Direct costs include items such as legal, accounting, and other professional fees, 
reorganization costs, etc. and have been found to fall between 4% and 10% of firm value three 
years prior to bankruptcy.  [1,5]  In this paper, I extend the measurement methodology devised 
by Altman for indirect costs beyond the retail and industrial sectors to include consumer brands, 
energy, financial, technology, transportation, and utilities.  By taking a cross-section of firms 
from diverse industries, an attempt is made to isolate industry characteristics that lead to 
higher/lower indirect costs among industries.  This study does not treat each industry 
exhaustively (e.g., sample sizes within each industry are small).  Rather, it is intended to 
highlight possible areas of further research, and to support the research results achieved to date 
on the issue of the significance of indirect bankruptcy costs. 
II. Methodology 
The method used to measure indirect bankruptcy costs was developed by Altman [1], and 
involves the measurement of lost profits as a result of financial distress.  A firm’s sales are first 
regressed to those of the industry in which it operates for the ten years prior to the measurement 
period.  Industry sales are based on the sales generated by the ten largest companies in the firm’s 
industry.  The regression formula obtained from this process is then used to predict sales going 
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forward for the company, based on the actual sales generated by the industry.  After the firm’s 
sales are forecast for the measurement period, the average net profit margin over the prior ten 
years is applied to arrive at an estimated profit for each year leading up to the firm’s bankruptcy 
filing.  This profit estimation is then compared to the firm’s actual profit for that period, and the 
difference is considered to be the indirect cost of bankruptcy.  These costs are measured for the 
year of the bankruptcy, and two years prior.   
III. Firm Sample 
Table 1 lists the firms included in this study, the industry each firm represents, and the 
month and year of the firm’s bankruptcy filing.  Firms were selected from the past decade for 
timeliness, and selections were limited to those firms that had been operating for at least thirteen 
years prior to filing.  Where possible, multiple firms were included in an industry. 
 Table 1 
Industry Company 
Date of Bankruptcy 
Filing 
Capital Goods Apogee March 1998 
 Armstrong December 2000 
 Harnischfeger June 1998 
 Owens Corning October 1998 
 USG Corp March 1993 
Consumer Cyclicals  Emerson Electronics October 1993 
 Fruit of the Loom December 1999 
 Zenith Electronics December 1998 
Energy Presidio Oil March 1995 
Financial ICH Corp October 1995 
Specialty Retail Levitz Furniture September 1997 
 Service Merchandise March 1999 
Technology Anacomp  January 1996 
 Wang Labs August 1992 
Transportation Builder’s Transport March 1998 
Utilities El Paso Electric January 1992 
 
III. Critiques of the Measurement Method 
In his discussion of the regression technique, Altman notes that it is difficult to isolate 
indirect bankruptcy costs.  The firm might be experiencing an unexpected reduction in profits 
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from the specter of bankruptcy, while at the same time the unexpected reduction in profits may 
lead the firm to declare bankruptcy.  It is possible that factors completely unrelated to bankruptcy 
drain the firm’s expected profits, and may push the firm into bankruptcy quickly, limiting or 
eliminating altogether the costs sought in this method.  Another problem is determining the point 
at which indirect costs begin to accrue.  For example, in the cases of Owens Corning and 
Armstrong, the firms were pushed into bankruptcy when management determined that asbestos-
related lawsuits would continue to grow beyond the firms’ capacity to meet them.  This 
possibility must have been foreseeable by both customers and suppliers as early as 1982 when 
Manville declared bankruptcy for the same reason.  In these cases, the ten-year measurement 
period might be applied too late, effectively forecasting earnings with indirect costs already 
removed. 
Haugen and Senbet [3] raised another argument, which posits that Altman’s measure 
confuses the costs of liquidation with the costs of bankruptcy, and further states that the measure 
exaggerates the liquidation costs.  This argument is an extension of the causal problem listed 
earlier, but seems to miss an important point.  A firm experiencing indirect bankruptcy costs 
need not declare bankruptcy.  In the event that bankruptcy is avoided, the costs are nevertheless 
borne from financial distress, and should not be ignored.  The argument appears to be one of 
semantics, which stresses that bankruptcy is merely the transfer of ownership from stockholders 
to bondholders, rather than the cost of dismantling the assets of the firm upon liquidation.  
Stakeholders, then, have no reason to assume that bondholders would run the firm any less 
efficiently than stockholders.  They argue further that pointing to firms that were in distress and 
assuming the distress is what caused a fall in demand is a leap of faith.  An identical unlevered 
firm may have suffered the same decrease in product demand.  However, if an industry-wide 
downturn had occurred along with that faced by the firm, it would appear in the measure of 
 4
industry sales, and the firm’s expected profits would be adjusted to reflect it.  Therefore this 
problem, while valid, appears to have been solved in Altman’s method. 
IV. Regression Results 
Table 2 lists the results for the first portion of the measurement, sales predictions.  In the 
majority of cases the regressions on firm sales with industry sales over the selected ten-year 
period were good (12 out of 16 R2 > 50%), while many were excellent (6 out of 16 R2 > 80%). 
 Table 2. 
Industry Company Sales Regression R2 Industry Average R2 
Capital Goods Apogee 57.7% 43.84% 
 Armstrong 4.3%  
 Harnischfeger 56.7%  
 Owens Corning 61.8%  
 USG Corp 38.7%  
Consumer Cyclicals  Emerson Electronics 98.7% 79.77% 
 Fruit of the Loom 96.1%  
 Zenith Electronics 44.5%  
Energy Presidio Oil 55.7% 55.7% 
Financial ICH Corp 34.8% 34.8% 
Specialty Retail Levitz Furniture 76.7% 85.1% 
 Service Merchandise 93.4%  
Technology Anacomp  88.6% 84.4% 
 Wang Labs 80.2%  
Transportation Builder’s Transport 92.0% 92.0% 
Utilities El Paso Electric 62.3% 62.3% 
 
It is interesting to note that almost none of the variability in Armstrong’s sales is explained by 
overall industry sales, while Owens Corning, a very similar firm in terms of size, product, reason 
for distress, and timing of bankruptcy filing has a much higher R2.  The reason for this anomaly 
is unclear, but it highlights the complexities associated with these measurements. 
The results suggest that sales predictions will be most reliable for consumer cyclicals, 
specialty retail, technology, transportation, and, to a lesser extent, utilities and energy. 
Applying the average net margin over the ten-year sales regression period to predicted sales for 
each of the two years preceding bankruptcy (t-2, t-1) and to the year of the bankruptcy filing (t), 
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we get the estimated absolute indirect costs of bankruptcy.  Table 3 lists these estimates (IBC), as 
well as estimated firm value (FV) in each year, and bankruptcy costs as a percentage of firm 
value.  Firm value was estimated by adding to the year-end market value of equity all book 

































Capital Goods           
Apogee (10.1) 71.7 0.7 683.5 479.7 477.2 (1.5) 15.0 0.2 
Armstrong 108.9 81.2 66.6 4,351.3 3,090.6 1,604.3 2.5 2.6 4.1 
Harnischfeger (78.3) (101.6) 56.9 2,998.0 2,600.6 1,585.5 (2.6) (3.9) 3.4 
Owens Corning 704.5 (270.6) 362.5 3,744.3 2,684.3 2,067.2 18.8 (10.1) 17.5 
USG Corp 276.6 312.9 474.1 2,750.6 2,742.3 1,491.1 10.0 11.4 31.8 
Averages       5.5 3.0 11.5 
Consumer Cyclicals          
Emerson Electronics 44.4 41.7 39.6 13,657.6 13,320.8 15,250.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 
Fruit of the Loom 600.2 (21.1) 699.1 3,669.7 2,608.6 2,166.1 16.4 (0.8) 32.3 
Zenith Electronics 137.1 260.7 240.9 1,071.2 694.3 458.9 12.8 37.6 52.5 
Averages       9.8 12.4 28.3 
Energy          
Presidio Oil 3.2 20.5 23.2 348.8 312.0 246.9 0.9 6.6 9.4 
Financial          
ICH Corp (139.5) 418.9 256.3 663.1 690.5 420.9 (21.0) 60.7 60.9 
Specialty Retail          
Levitz Furniture 29.6 33.9 101 644.2 965.3 733.5 4.6 3.5 13.8 
Service Merchandise 169.9 193.4 340.1 1,065.5 970.8 909.6 16.0 19.9 37.4 
Averages       10.3 11.7 25.6 
Technology          
Anacomp  (54.0) (55.1) 189.2 657.2 559.2 421.0 (8.2) (9.9) 44.4 
Wang Labs 842.7 524.1 502.3 1,472.9 1,446.2 1,030.4 57.2 36.2 48.8 
Averages       24.5 13.2 46.9 
Transportation          
Builder’s Transport 9.9 17.8 53.3 433.3 412.6 361.1 2.3 4.3 14.8 
Utilities          
El Paso Electric 196.0 117.2 654.4 1,246.7 1,199.4 1,561.9 15.7 9.8 41.9 
          
AVERAGE       7.8 11.5 25.8 
 
Negative numbers depict years in which the firm earned profits in excess of those forecast for 
that year, implying a benefit from financial distress.  This occurred eight times in the sample, out 
of 48 observations, or 12.5% of the time.  However, it should be noted that the magnitude of 
 6
these counterintuitive results are far smaller than their normal counterparts in most cases (the 
exception being Harnischfeger).  Overall, the results suggest, as predicted, that in each industry 
there are costs associated with financial distress, and they normally escalate as a percentage of 
firm value as bankruptcy nears.  Based on these results, it is difficult to say that any meaningful 
comparison can be made among industries.  Even an intra-industry comparison of composite 
firms shows a great deal of variability each year among firms.  Variability notwithstanding, it is 
clear that these costs are not trivial in the aggregate, and should not be ignored by firms in their 
selection of an optimal capital structure. 
V. Comparison of Results to Original Study 
Altman’s study focused on two industries, retail and industrial.  For the sample of firms 
in both industries (N=18), the average ratio of indirect bankruptcy costs to firm value was 
calculated to be 7.1% in year t-2.  This is fairly close to the results obtained in the current study, 
where the average ratio in year t-2 was calculated to be 7.8%.  In year t-1, Altman’s average ratio 
drops to 6.6%, while the ratio calculated herein rises to 11.5%.  Finally, in the last year, t, 
Altman’s average rises to 10.5% compared to 25.8% in my sample.  One reason for the 
difference may be Altman’s inclusion of operating leases in the calculation of firm value.  As the 
firm nears bankruptcy, these leases may play a larger role in firm value, which would adjust my 
ratios upward with respect to Altman’s.  The present results are consistent with Warner’s [5], 
who found that firm values fall consistently as bankruptcy approaches. 
VI. Other Applications 
Having obtained estimates of indirect bankruptcy costs for a sample of sixteen firms 
across eight industries, it is now possible to examine some of the hypotheses put forth regarding 
the nature of these costs and the factors determining their magnitude.  A study conducted by 
David Flath and Charles Knoeber [2] found that by comparing Warner’s direct bankruptcy costs 
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to the estimated total failure costs obtained in their study, indirect costs were likely to be 
substantial, and highly correlated to firm size.  By regressing the log of estimated bankruptcy 
costs to the log of firm value, I found that indirect costs are positively correlated to firm size, 
although there are clearly other factors at play.  Figure 1 shows a plot of the log of indirect 
bankruptcy costs to the log of firm size, with a fitted regression line.   












R-Sq = 30.0 %
Y = -8.9E-01 + 0.851711X
Regression Plot
 
The R2 of 30% highlights the limited ability of firm size to explain the variations in the size of 
indirect bankruptcy costs.  However, the graph supports the results obtained by Flath and 
Knoeber.  Substituting other proxies for firm size, such as sales or total assets, yielded very 
similar results.  Therefore, it appears that indirect bankruptcy costs are positively correlated to 
firm size. 
The more interesting question is whether or not there is a variable or set of variables that 
can explain how indirect bankruptcy costs are determined from firm to firm.  For example, what 
accounts for the stability of Emerson Electronics’ IBC/FV ratio over the three-year estimation 
period, relative to the quadrupling of the same ratio over the period for Zenith Electronics?   
Moreover, Zenith’s total indirect bankruptcy costs substantially exceed those of Emerson for 
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each of the three years, despite Emerson’s dominance over Zenith in terms of firm value.  This 
strange result seems to support Haugen and Senbets’ criticisms of the present method.  They 
argue that if markets are rational and make unbiased forecasts, Altman’s measure merely 
captures a forecasting error that may have nothing to do with bankruptcy. 
Setting such arguments aside for the moment, I conducted a series of tests on the current 
sample, designed to locate the main factor or factors that determine how these estimated costs are 
realized.  Assuming that indirect bankruptcy costs are, in fact, costs arising from the fear of 
liquidation, I tested the levels of intangible assets as a percentage of total assets and as a 
percentage of firm value against the observed cost estimates.  The theory here is that, in 
liquidation, intangible assets will have little or no value as compared to tangible assets.  
Therefore, indirect bankruptcy costs as a percentage of firm value should be higher in firms 
whose asset structure is heavily weighted by intangibles.  Figure 2 shows the plot of indirect 























It is clearly illustrated that for this sample, indirect bankruptcy costs had little to do with the 
proportion of intangible assets to total assets.  The large portion of the sample that had no 
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intangible assets shows a wide range of IBC/FV outcomes, and for those firms that have 
intangibles on the balance sheet, no real pattern is discernible in the plot. 
Another interesting idea was summarized by John [4], which states that there is a positive 
relationship between corporate liquidity and the costs of financial distress.  To test this 
hypothesis on the current firm sample, I used the current ratios as the measure of liquidity, and 
regressed them against their respective IBC/FV ratios.  Figure 3 shows the result. 
Figure 3. 
















As the plot shows, the result is fairly random.  However, there is a slight positive slope of 0.28 to 
the regression, with an R2 of 10%.  This seems to support the argument, as firms whose IBC/FV 
ratios are high seem to be slightly favoring more liquid asset structures. 
The final test applied to this data set was designed to focus on the supplier reaction to a 
firm’s financial distress.  If relationships are strained by financial distress, which generally result 
in a higher cost of inputs to the distressed firm, we should see a decline in gross margins as 
suppliers raise prices, remove discounts, demand better terms, etc.  To test this, the average gross 
profit margin was measured for the ten-year sales regression period.  Then the gross profit 
margin achieved in each of the next three years was compared to this average.  Table 4 displays 
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the results of this test.  Years in which the gross margins improved relative to the ten-year 
average are highlighted in gray.  The number reported is the percentage change in the gross 
profit margin from the calculated average. 
Table 4. 
Company 
% Change in  
Gross Margins 
(t-2) 
% Change in 
Gross Margins 
(t-1) 
% Change in 
Gross Margins 
(t) 
Capital Goods     
Apogee (13.80) 0.75 23.90 
Armstrong 16.95 11.93 (0.97) 
Harnischfeger 14.31 14.01 (44.65) 
Owens Corning (10.73) (9.12) (16.82) 
USG Corp (7.44) (16.48) (21.42) 
Averages (0.14) 0.22 (11.99) 
Consumer Cyclicals    
Emerson Electronics 3.77 2.33 5.58 
Fruit of the Loom (6.80) (17.02) (16.99) 
Zenith Electronics (36.34) (43.90) (44.31) 
Averages (13.12) (19.53) (18.59) 
Energy    
Presidio Oil (27.62) 1.71 (1.35) 
Financial    
ICH Corp (127.72) (10.31) (237.37) 
Specialty Retail    
Levitz Furniture (6.68) (8.34) (11.27) 
Service Merchandise (0.04) (4.02) (1.69) 
Averages (3.36) (6.18) (6.48) 
Technology    
Anacomp  11.30 4.41 (5.64) 
Wang Labs (5.53) (5.65) (13.60) 
Averages 2.88 (0.62) (9.62) 
Transportation    
Builder’s Transport (6.63) (44.52) (64.90) 
Utilities    
El Paso Electric (31.70) (43.73) (38.35) 
    
AVERAGE (14.67) (10.50) (30.62) 
 
Although the sample shows high variability with respect to this measure, in the aggregate it does 
appear that there is a substantial change downward in gross margins as the firm nears 
bankruptcy.  These results suggest that those firms that can find ways to appease their suppliers 
stand to avoid a lot of the costs associated with financial distress.  Of the eight occurrences in 
which indirect bankruptcy costs were calculated to be negative, half are associated with periods 
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of rising gross margins above the ten-year average.  The average of IBC/FV in year (t) for those 
firms experiencing higher than average gross margins in year (t) was just 0.25%, compared to the 
average of 25.8% in that year overall.  The average of IBC/FV in year (t-1) for those firms 
experiencing higher than average gross margins in that year were 1.8%, compared to 11.5% 
overall.  Finally, the average of IBC/FV in year (t-2) for those firms experiencing higher than 
average gross margins in that year were –2%, compared to 7.8% overall. 
VII. Conclusion  
Using the lost profits methodology developed by Altman, an analysis was conducted on 
the estimated indirect bankruptcy costs observed across industries.  In the aggregate these costs 
were found to be quite high with respect to firm value, and the results support previous assertions 
made by academics as to the significance of these indirect costs on optimizing capital structures.  
While there is still no easy way to predict the magnitude of these costs for a given firm, a 
positive correlation was found between firm size and the magnitude of indirect bankruptcy costs.  
No correlation was found to exist between the ratio of intangible assets over total assets and the 
ratio of indirect bankruptcy costs over firm value.  A slight positive correlation was found 
between current ratios and the IBC/FV ratio, suggesting that those firms experiencing high 
financial distress costs will tend to move toward a more liquid asset structure.  Finally, gross 
margin trends were tested, and verified that the cost of inputs rises as a result of financial 
distress.  Those firms managing to maintain a slight improvement over average gross margins in 
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